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INTRODUCTION
People trust their doctors. Indeed, polls indicate that
doctors—along with nurses—consistently rank among the most
trusted professionals in the United States based on their
reputation for honesty and ethical conduct.1 This high level of
trust is critical to effective health care delivery.2 Why, then,


Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Helen
Norton and the editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for inviting me
to participate in the Ira C. Rothgerber Symposium.
1. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/
honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
DB92-2GBD]. Every year since 1990, Gallup has conducted a poll of Americans’
views regarding the honesty and ethics of various professions. The three highestranked professions in 2016 were nurses, pharmacists, and doctors (in that order).
Id. This finding is relatively consistent with findings in prior years. See Rebecca
Rifkin, Americans Rate Nurses Highest on Honesty, Ethical Standards, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/180260/americans-rate-nurses-highest-honestyethical-standards.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SG53-CTC3].
Lawyers, sadly, rank rather low, but significantly above members of Congress.
Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra (finding only 18 percent of Americans rank
lawyers “very high” or “high” in honesty and ethics, compared with 8 percent for
members of Congress).
2. See, e.g., Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of
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would the government ever require doctors to provide false or
misleading medical information to their patients? And what
would be the impact of such a requirement? Those are the
questions at the heart of this Article.
State-mandated falsehoods are rampant in the context of
abortion regulation. State legislatures have required doctors,
before performing abortions, to provide scientifically
unsupported information to women, such as that having an
abortion increases the risk of breast cancer or that it has
negative mental health effects.3 Given the lack of evidence to
sustain these sorts of claims, it seems reasonable to refer to
such statements as government-mandated lies.4 However,
these lies are different in many respects from the sorts of lies
that have been studied in the growing literature on the legal
regulation of lies, both private and governmental.5 The goal of
this Article is to consider the unique problems raised by the
misleading statements that the government mandates in the
abortion context and to suggest a doctrinal framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of such lies.
This Article argues that government-mandated lies in the
abortion context are unique in several ways that make them
unlikely to be found unconstitutional despite the fact that they
obviously hinder patients’ interest in access to information and
to a constitutionally protected procedure. First, it is often
difficult to categorize the kind of speech in which the lie occurs;

Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1708, 1708, 1713
(1998).
3. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii) (2017). As another
example, Arizona passed a law in 2015 requiring women to be informed that a
nonsurgical abortion is reversible after it has begun. 2015 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH.
87. This law was repealed after the state failed to produce any credible evidence to
support the law’s claim. See 2016 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 267 (repealing 2015
ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 87).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Beck, Why Is Arizona Forcing Doctors to Lie to Women
Who Need Abortions?, ACLU (June 4, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakfreely/why-arizona-forcing-doctors-lie-women-who-need-abortions
[https://perma.cc/PX9Y-N5KP].
5. See, e.g., SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS 3 (2014)
(predominately discussing legal regulation of private lies); Helen Norton, The
Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 99–107 (2015)
[hereinafter Norton, The Government’s Lies] (exploring government lies that
threaten personal liberties protected by the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161
(arguing that the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of some but
not all types of private lies).
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this difficulty hinders the First Amendment analysis. Second,
although it is rhetorically effective to call these misleading
statements “lies,” it is in fact somewhat difficult to say whether
that label properly applies.6 Finally, the sorts of harms
imposed by the government’s lies in this context are in many
respects distinct from those created by governmental lies in
other contexts. The uniqueness of the harm makes these lies a
poor fit with existing doctrinal tests. Ultimately, this article
concludes that the primary harm caused by governmental
falsehoods in the abortion context is a form of expressive
injury. Analogizing to the harm caused by violations of the
Establishment Clause or by racist speech, I argue that under
the revised framework established by the Supreme Court in the
2016 case Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,7 such
expressive harms can and should be recognized as imposing an
unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right.
Part I of this Article gives an overview of the kinds of lies
that state governments promulgate in the abortion context.
These lies include falsehoods that come in the form of
government-sponsored speech as well as in the form of untrue
or misleading statements that health care providers are legally
required to share with patients. Part I also considers a
different kind of governmental lie, which is represented by
laws that impose a false narrative on women about the
meaning of abortion and pregnancy. Next, Part II considers
some of the ways in which such lies are unique, as compared to
the sorts of government lies considered by other scholars. Part
II argues that false or misleading government-mandated
disclosures in the abortion context are difficult to categorize for
purposes of First Amendment doctrine. In fact, it may even be
difficult to call them outright lies, unlike—for example—
government officials’ falsehoods about military activities or
knowing lies told by a prosecutor to secure a criminal
conviction.8 In addition, Part II proposes that the
predominantly expressive nature of the harm caused by
government lies in the abortion context is a unique feature of

6. As I discuss further in Section II.B, the definition of a “lie” is debatable,
and indeed has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 12–15 & nn.16–25 (discussing the author’s definition of
lying and contrasting it with other philosophers’ definitions).
7. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
8. See Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 73–74, 79 & n.28.
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those lies. Finally, Part III considers how misleading disclosure
requirements in the abortion context should be analyzed under
the Constitution, proposing that even if such requirements are
constitutional under the First Amendment, they raise
significant problems under the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.

THE LIES STATES TELL

This Part discusses the various kinds of misleading
statements that are required by state law abortion restrictions
and briefly explains the doctrinal framework that applies to
each. States have generally introduced falsehoods into the
abortion context through informed consent requirements.
These laws statutorily mandate that specific information be
given in order to meet the requirements of informed consent
that apply to all medical and surgical procedures. For example,
state laws often provide that consent will not be considered
informed—and therefore civil or criminal liability may attach—
if particular information is not provided.9
Sometimes, this information must be provided in
government-created literature—in other words, through
government speech.10 Section I.A describes the laws that
mandate these sorts of lies, here called “direct government
lies.” Other statutes require abortion providers themselves to
give particular information. As discussed in Section I.B, these
requirements—which I call “compelled private lies”—
commandeer private speakers for the government’s message
and may pose greater First Amendment problems than those
that come directly from the government.11 For both types of
informed-consent requirements, however, state laws often
provide a sort of escape hatch by which physicians may
distance themselves from the message by giving further
context or explaining that they disagree with the statement
that they are required by law to provide.12
9. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(B), (G) (2017) (subjecting a
physician to civil liability for failure to provide a woman with certain information
twenty-four hours before performing an abortion); id. § 2919.192 (imposing
criminal penalties for failure to inform a woman of the existence of a fetal
heartbeat).
10. See infra Section I.A.
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 n.8 (8th
Cir. 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.013(c) (2017); cf. Rumsfeld v.
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Also considered in this Part is a different form of falsehood.
Specifically, Section I.C discusses regulations that are aimed at
creating a particular narrative about pregnancy that is false
and misleading in that it takes one possible perspective among
many and treats it as the one true perspective. This category of
“false narratives” includes requirements that physicians
provide an ultrasound to women seeking abortions,
accompanied by a requirement that the woman must view the
ultrasound or listen to a narrated description of the
ultrasound.13 It also includes the recent wave of laws that
require burial or cremation of fetal remains.14 This Section
explains that these laws are aimed at imposing a particular
understanding of pregnancy on the woman—one that generally
conflicts with the woman’s understanding. They are considered
together with more typical, obviously misleading statements
because, as discussed in Section II.C, they impose similar types
of harms.
A.

Direct Government Lies

In this Article, I use the term “direct government lies” to
refer to falsehoods or misleading statements that are
articulated by the government and provided to the patient in
the form of direct government speech. For example, some states
require certain abortion-related information be given in statecreated brochures or materials, which are then provided to the
woman by the abortion clinic. Although the abortion provider
plays a role in conveying this information to the patient, it is
obvious with respect to such government-produced materials
that the source of the speech is the state.
Some such state-produced materials contain false or
misleading scientific information. For instance, Texas law
requires physicians to provide certain printed materials to

Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69–70 (2006) (rejecting
a claim that a requirement to allow military recruiters on campus violated
students’ and faculty members’ freedom of association, in part because those
individuals remained free to associate “to voice their disapproval of the military’s
message”).
13. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017), held unconstitutional by
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
14. E.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132-1.136 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-343-4(a) (2017).
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women seeking abortions.15 Those materials describe the risks
of abortion in ways that are lacking in context and likely to
confuse the reader.16 To take one example, the brochure
published by the Texas Department of Health and Human
Services, called A Woman’s Right to Know, references an
increased risk of future infertility from abortion without
explaining the extremely small likelihood of such an outcome.17
In fact, the overall risk of serious complications is very low, and
future infertility is not even a risk that is specifically
recognized by the medical literature.18 Thus, though the
brochure’s statement is not false in a strict sense, it is
presented in a highly misleading manner and likely to be
misconstrued by a reader who is not well versed in the
scientific literature.
Another example of state-sanctioned misinformation
involves the purported link between abortion and breast
cancer. The same Texas brochure contains the following
paragraph regarding breast cancer as a risk of induced
abortion:
Your pregnancy history affects your chances of getting
breast cancer. If you give birth to your baby, you are less
likely to develop breast cancer in the future. Research
indicates that having an abortion will not provide you this
increased protection against breast cancer. In addition,
doctors and scientists are actively studying the complex
biology of breast cancer to understand whether abortion
may affect the risk of breast cancer. If you have a family
15. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.013(a) (2017).
16. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 9
(2016).
17. Id. Although the statements in the brochure that infertility is a risk of
abortion and that “[t]he further along you are in your pregnancy, the greater the
chance of serious complications that can cause you to be infertile” are technically
true, they may suggest to someone unversed in the medical literature that the
risks associated with abortion are substantial. Id.
18. Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency Department Visits and
Complications After Abortion, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 175, 175 (2015)
(finding, based on a study of California Medicaid patients, that the overall
complication rate for abortion is 2.1 percent and that the rate of major
complications, such as the kind that can lead to infertility, is only 0.23 percent);
see also Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of Pregnancy
Termination on Future Reproduction, 4 BAILLIÈRE’S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 391 (1990) (finding no significant risk of reproductive problems
following abortion).
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history of breast cancer or breast disease, ask your doctor
how your pregnancy will affect your risk of breast cancer.19

This paragraph implies that there is a medical link
between choosing abortion and an elevated risk of breast
cancer or, at the very least, it suggests that the jury is still out
on this question. However, the National Cancer Institute—
which is a division of the National Institutes of Health and “the
federal government’s principal agency for cancer research”20—
has found that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an
increase in breast cancer risk.”21 Moreover, it has indicated
that that finding is supported by the strongest scientific
evidence.22
In a similar vein, the Alaska Department of Health and
Social Services, in its online materials, presents information on
the purported abortion-breast cancer link in a highly
misleading manner. First, it provides the view of the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) disputing
any link between abortion and breast cancer.23 ACOG is the
principal membership organization for physicians in that
specialty area.24 Directly after this, it describes the view of the
19. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16, at 9.
20. National Cancer Institute Overview and Mission, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/overview (last visited July 11, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/J4VE-TXV7].
21. Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk: 2003 Workshop, NAT’L
CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/types/breast/abortion-miscarriage-risk (last
visited June 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K5ZX-G8GF].
22. Id.
23. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., MAKING A DECISION ABOUT
YOUR PREGNANCY, (2010), http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/documents/informed
consent/assets/abortion.pdf [https://perma.cc/K78B-HUPA]. Alaska law gives the
physician the option of either providing this internet information to the woman or
informing her of “the nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the
proposed procedure that a reasonable patient would consider material to making
a voluntary and informed decision of whether to undergo the procedure.” ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 18.16.060(b) (2017). Given the official statements quoted above on
the subject of breast cancer risk, it is probably not entirely clear, as a matter of
Alaska law, whether a “reasonable patient” would consider that information
“material” to her abortion decision. It is therefore logical to assume that a prudent
physician would simply opt to provide the state-sponsored message to the patient
in order to avoid the risk of liability.
24. About Us, AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG),
https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/About-Us (last visited Aug. 15, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T7E8-7MKL]. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists is associated with, but distinct from, the American Congress of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which is dedicated to advocacy on behalf of
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American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (AAPLOG)—an advocacy organization dedicated
to “encourag[ing] and equip[ping] its members and other
concerned medical practitioners to provide an evidence-based
rationale for defending the lives of both the pregnant mother
and her unborn child.”25 Unsurprisingly, the AAPLOG quote
asserts that such a link exists.26 This juxtaposition of the two
sources, without further commentary, appears to put the two
sources on equal footing, although one source is an objective
medical source and the other comes from a political advocacy
organization. The Texas and Alaska materials do not provide
any actual statistics or reference the National Cancer
Institute’s finding, which might allow the reader to put these
two opposing viewpoints into context.
Despite their obviously misleading nature, such
statements are unlikely to raise First Amendment concerns
because they involve government speech.27 The government is
generally unconstrained by the First Amendment when it
expresses its own message.28 It need not observe the standards
of content or viewpoint neutrality.29 In addition, there is little
danger that the patient will mistake the state-sponsored
brochure for the physician’s own message, and the physician is
entitled in any case to provide additional context for the
information in the state’s materials.30 There is, therefore, no
concern about the speech being misattributed to a private

ob/gyns. The two organizations share a website.
25. Our Mission Statement, AAPLOG, http://aaplog.org/about-us/our-missionstatement/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7VCC-XV8R].
26. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., supra note 23 (“The American
Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) supports the
view that there is a causal relationship between breast cancer and the
termination of pregnancy.”).
27. See infra Part II.
28. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government
Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2010) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009))
(noting that the First Amendment does not constrain government speech). Helen
Norton has argued, however, that governmental lies ought to be understood to
violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment in some circumstances.
Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 99–107.
29. Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80.
30. Cf. Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 844 (2010)
(arguing that constitutional problems may arise when government speech can be
mistakenly attributed to individuals, but that the ability to distance oneself from
the government speech may be relevant).
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speaker and no damage to the speaker’s own interests. As
explained at greater length in Part III, however, such
requirements may violate the Due Process Clause by imposing
an undue burden on abortion rights.
B.

Compelled Private Lies

Even more troubling than misleading statements in
government publications are compelled private lies. These are
government-mandated falsehoods that physicians are required
to provide directly to women seeking abortions within the
context of a doctor-patient counseling session. I refer to these
statements as “compelled private lies” because they are
misleading or false statements that the government forces
private speakers to pronounce. For example, South Dakota
requires doctors to inform women that abortion carries an
“[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”31 According to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals—which considered a
challenge to this requirement—some studies had in fact
indicated that the risk of suicide was greater among women
who had had abortions than among women who had not, but
there was no evidence to support the notion that the greater
risk was caused by the abortion (as opposed to being caused by
the unplanned pregnancy itself or other mental health issues
that may correlate with unplanned pregnancy).32 The Eighth
Circuit nonetheless upheld the provision, explaining that it
was true that women who have had abortions have a greater
relative risk of suicide than women who have not, regardless of
the cause, and that relative risk is often synonymous with
increased risk.33 There was, therefore, a possible reading
according to which the required disclosure was true and, for
this reason, the appeals court vacated the lower court’s order
enjoining the law.34
From a free speech perspective, requirements that turn
abortion providers into mouthpieces for the state are
31. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii)(2017)).
32. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 900–02; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion
Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1182–85 (2014) (explaining, based on
scientific studies, that “abortion does not in fact undermine women’s mental
health”).
33. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 895.
34. Id. at 905–06.
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considerably more problematic than government speech.
Because they compel private speech, the First Amendment
applies.35 There is a risk, of course, of misattribution—that is,
that the woman will think that the speech reflects the doctor’s
views rather than those of the state.36 In addition, some such
speech requirements are almost blatantly ideological. The
commandeering of an individual’s body and mind to require a
political or ideological utterance with which the individual
disagrees usually violates the right to freedom of expression.37
The caselaw on compelled speech divides the speech to be
compelled into different categories, which correspond to
different levels of scrutiny. Compelled speech is generally
subject to strict scrutiny when it is ideological in nature.38
Thus, in Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood v.
Templeton, the district court found that Planned Parenthood
was likely to succeed in its challenge to a Kansas law requiring
the clinic to include a hyperlink to a government internet site
containing inaccurate and biased information about abortion.39
For example, the government site asserted that pregnancy
begins with fertilization, whereas the medical consensus is that
pregnancy begins with implantation; it understated the
number of pregnancies that end naturally in miscarriage; and
it stated that “[a]bortion terminates the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being.”40 Under the statute,
Planned Parenthood was required to refer to this information
as being “objective, nonjudgmental, [and] scientifically
accurate.”41 Ultimately, the court did not clearly hold that this
requirement violated Planned Parenthood’s free speech rights
35. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
36. Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas
Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 337, 370 (2016) (“The right against compelled speech is
best understood as a right not to foster a message one does not wish to foster, but
sometimes the Court focuses on the concern with being improperly tagged with a
message with which one does not want to be associated.”).
37. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631–34 (1943);
Greene, supra note 36, at 370.
38. Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 at 713; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
939, 957 (2007).
39. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v.
Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1219 (D. Kan. 2013).
40. Id. at 1219 n.16.
41. Id. at 1212.
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but instead, after declaring the case to be a close one, stated
that the provision “appears overbroad,” at least with respect to
non-patients who may view Planned Parenthood’s website.42
When the speech is considered either commercial or
professional in nature, the level of scrutiny applied is lower.43
Although the free-speech doctrine pertaining to professional
speech is relatively undeveloped,44 it is clear that the state is
permitted to mandate a wider range of factual disclosures in
the context of the doctor-patient relationship—particularly in
the form of informed consent requirements—than in other
private speech contexts.45 The regulation of private speech in
the form of informed consent law may be considered an aspect
of the regulation of the medical profession itself.46 As such,
constitutional doctrine in this context is concerned primarily
with the protection of the patient rather than with the
expressive interests of the speaker.47

42. Id. at 1221. It appears that the case settled before trial. Order
Administratively Closing Case, Dkt. 56, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 13-CV-02302
(administratively closing the case and ordering the parties to submit a stipulation
of dismissal).
43. Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 n.17; Post, supra note 38, at 949
(“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be censored and
suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical
establishment. But when a physician speaks to a patient in the course of medical
treatment, his opinions are normally regulated on the theory that they are
inseparable from the practice of medicine.”); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial
Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 786–88 (1999); see also Claudia E. Haupt, Professional
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1246–68 (2016) (defining professional speech and
distinguishing it from other kinds of speech).
44. For example, the Third Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in a case
involving a state law ban on licensed counselors engaging in a form of therapy
known as sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE). King v. Governor of N.J., 767
F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[P]rohibitions of professional speech are
constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s interest in protecting its
citizens from harmful or ineffective professional practices and are no more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”). In so doing, it followed the lead
of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. at 232 (citing Wollschlaeger v. Florida,
760 F.3d 1195, 1217–26 (11th Cir. 2014); Moore–King v. Cty. of Chesterfield,
Va., 708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 2013)). However, other courts have suggested
that professional speech restrictions should receive more deferential review (e.g.,
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014)), or that compelled speech in
a professional or commercial context requires only rational-basis scrutiny (see,
e.g., Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2010)).
45. Haupt, supra note 43, at 1258; B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis
Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60 (2015).
46. Hill, supra note 45, at 60.
47. Id. at 62.
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One of the most important cases dealing with professional
speech arose in the abortion context. In the seminal case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court considered a
claim that Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirements for
abortion violated the physician’s First Amendment rights by
requiring her to provide specific state-mandated information to
the patient.48 The state-mandated information included “the
nature of the procedure, the health risks of abortion and of
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn
child,’” as well as “the availability of printed materials
published by the State describing the fetus and providing
information about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father, and a list of
agencies which provide adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion.”49 Of course, none of these statements
was false or even misleading.
In a very brief passage, the Court rejected the free-speech
claim out of hand:
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the
requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.50

The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its
dismissive treatment of the claim, suggest something like
rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech
claim.
The Court also considered whether the informed consent
requirements imposed an undue burden on abortion rights,
applying the standard that the Casey plurality had just
adopted for analyzing abortion restrictions.51 After a somewhat
lengthier analysis, the Court also held that relevant, truthful,
and nonmisleading informed consent requirements did not

48. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
49. Id. at 881.
50. Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 603 (1977)).
51. Id. at 874.
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constitute an undue burden.52 Concluding that the state had a
legitimate interest in ensuring that the woman’s choice was
well-informed and that both psychological risks of abortion and
“impact on the fetus” were relevant to her decision, the Court
upheld the Pennsylvania requirements.53
As an added twist, some courts simply decline to apply
First Amendment doctrine at all to compelled-speech
challenges arising in the abortion context.54 For example, the
same South Dakota law requiring that women be informed of
their increased suicide risk also required doctors to tell them
that they were about to “terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being.”55 Rather than consider whether
such a compelled ideological statement met the First
Amendment standard of strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit
simply merged the First Amendment analysis with the “undue
burden” standard laid out in Casey for identifying violations of
the Due Process right to abortion.56 The court explained:
[T]he [Supreme] Court found no violation of the physician’s
right not to speak, without need for further analysis of
whether the requirements were narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, . . . where physicians merely were
required to give ‘truthful, nonmisleading information’
relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.57

Thus, compelled private lies fall in a sort of no-man’s-land of
First Amendment doctrine, in which it is unclear which freespeech analysis applies—if any applies at all.

52. Id. at 882.
53. Id. at 881–84.
54. See Corbin, supra note 32, at 1191–92; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion
Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047,
1068–83 (2014).
55. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.
2008).
56. Id. at 734; see also Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (merging the undue burden and First
Amendment analyses, and finding that informed consent requirements “do not fall
under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment
strict scrutiny”).
57. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734.
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False Narratives

A recent wave of legislation imposes requirements on
abortion providers that seem, at first glance, to have little or
nothing to do with speech. However, these laws have an
expressive function, and this expressive function is, in fact, one
of the laws’ most important features.58 For example, both Texas
and Indiana have recently passed laws requiring that fetal
tissue be buried or cremated, as if it were a human corpse
rather than tissue removed during a medical procedure.59 As
another example, in 2011, North Carolina passed a law
requiring every patient to receive an ultrasound before an
abortion.60 In the course of the ultrasound, the provider was
required to give the following narration:
a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting,
which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions
of the unborn child within the uterus and the number of
unborn children depicted. The individual performing the
display shall offer the pregnant woman the opportunity to
hear the fetal heart tone. . . . [d]isplay the images so that
the pregnant woman may view them[, and] [p]rovide a
medical description of the images, which shall include the
dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of
external members and internal organs, if present and
viewable.61

If she wished, the woman could cover her ears and avert her
eyes, but the provider would still be required to give the abovedescribed narration.62 In other words, the state was requiring
the provider to delineate the human features of the fetus,
whether or not the woman wanted to hear about them. Thus,
the North Carolina law forced the provider to parrot the state’s
narrative of fetal personhood and to do so regardless of any
possible impact of the narrative on the patient herself. The
58. For a general overview of expressivism in law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson
& Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000).
59. E.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132-1.136; IND. CODE § 16-34-3-4(a).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017).
61. Id.
62. Id. at § 90-21.85(b); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 252–53 (4th Cir.
2014).
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narrative might have been psychologically traumatizing in
some circumstances, or it might have had no impact at all if a
particular woman chose to plug her ears and look away. Falsenarrative laws may therefore be understood as a form of
symbolic government speech (and as such are related to the
category of direct government lies discussed above). They
convey a message to patients and to the public at large through
requiring particular conduct, rather than through speech.
States justify these false-narrative laws on various
grounds. North Carolina claimed that its ultrasound
requirement was a measure to ensure that the woman’s
consent was fully informed.63 Indiana asserted that its law
regarding burial or cremation of fetal remains served to protect
the dignity of fetal life.64 However, these laws clearly impose on
the woman, and perhaps on the public, a particular conception
of the fetus and pregnancy.65 They encourage, and are likely
intended to encourage, or even force, women to think of fetuses
in utero as babies and to put themselves in a mothering role
with respect to that fetus.66 They force both the woman and the
abortion provider to go through the motions of prenatal care (in
the case of ultrasound laws) or of stillbirth (in the case of
burial/cremation laws), thus coercing the woman to
contemplate a very different setting from that of intentional
pregnancy termination. Of course, many women who choose to
abort either do not view or wish to view the fetus in the same
way that they would view a wanted pregnancy.67
Moreover, these laws, by their very enactment (often
accompanied by a great deal of publicity), send the same
63. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 251.
64. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859,
870–71 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (describing the state’s asserted interests).
65. Fetal tissue disposal laws may also be intended to impose heavy financial
burdens on abortion clinics that may, in some cases, force them to close, or they
may be intended to give funeral homes and crematoria the power to prevent
abortion clinics from operating by refusing to accept fetal remains. See, e.g., Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 230–32 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
66. Cf. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the
Problem for Law, 100 CAL. L. REV. 269, 307 (2012) (discussing laws allowing the
issuance of birth certificates for stillborns and “the implicit relationship between
acknowledging birth and establishing fetal personhood”); Carol Sanger, Seeing
and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 351, 401 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and Believing] (“The
image is being offered to prove that this fetus is your child. It is something in the
order of a dare.”).
67. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 66, at 401.
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messages to the public at large, thus increasing the stigma
surrounding the abortion procedure and perhaps magnifying
any guilt or shame the woman might feel about her decision. It
is not uncommon for the legislation to contain colorful and
politically charged language, such as referring to the fetus as
an “unborn child.”68 Such language furthers the narrative that
the pregnant woman is already a mother, and that her
pregnancy termination is murder. This kind of legislation, by
telegraphing a denigrating message about abortion and by
forcing the provider and the woman to participate in enacting a
narrative of motherhood and fetal personhood that the state
has imposed upon them, stigmatizes both patients and
providers.
Although such laws have expressive content, they
implicate “speech,” if at all, only indirectly. Therefore, they are
usually not found to violate the First Amendment.69 Instead, a
few of these laws have been challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the Indiana law regulating disposal
of fetal tissue was found to run afoul of substantive due process
because it lacked any legitimate purpose.70 This holding
applied the fundamental principle that all laws must have a
legitimate purpose, which is not a requirement that is specific
to abortion restrictions.71 Faced with a similar law from Texas,
the Fifth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction on grounds of
vagueness and undue burden, finding that the difficulty of
complying with the law substantially outweighed the claimed
benefit of respecting fetal dignity.72 In contrast, in considering
an ultrasound requirement, the Fifth Circuit merged the First
68. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017); ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4
(2017). Fetal tissue legislation recently proposed (but not enacted) in Ohio used
the derogatory term “abortionist” to refer to physicians who perform abortions.
H.R. 149, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).
69. Ultrasound and, especially, required ultrasound narration are forms of
speech and have been analyzed under the First Amendment. Indeed, in Stuart v.
Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a claim that an
ultrasound requirement violated the First Amendment. 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th
Cir. 2014). However, I argue here that the constitutional problems with falsenarrative laws do not arise from the content of the ultrasound or the speech
accompanying it, which is factual; instead, they arise from the expressive content
of the required conduct.
70. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859,
870 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
71. Id.
72. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232 (W.D.
Tex. 2017).
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Amendment and “undue burden” analyses and found that,
because the information provided by the ultrasound was
relevant, truthful, and nonmisleading, the law was
constitutional.73 None of these cases, however, explicitly
considered the expressive harm wrought by the restrictions.
II. HOW THE PROBLEM OF LIES IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT IS
UNIQUE
The abortion context is legally unique in many respects.
This Part focuses on the particular ways in which statecompelled, misleading abortion-related disclosures pose special
problems for constitutional law. In particular, such
requirements are resistant to challenge under the First
Amendment. Direct government lies, as explained above,
generally constitute government speech and are therefore
immune to First Amendment challenges. Section II.A further
explains that compelled private lies, which are a form of
compelled speech, could be subject to free-speech challenges in
theory, but they are often difficult to categorize for First
Amendment purposes. As a result, some courts engage in a
highly deferential analysis of those falsehoods. Second, as
Section II.B discusses, the falsehoods contained in both direct
government lies and compelled private lies may be difficult to
identify, as they are often a product of the particular way in
which factual information is presented. Third, Section II.C
suggests that the primary harm resulting from lies in the
abortion disclosure context—whether direct government lies,
compelled private lies, or false narratives—differs from the sort
of harm usually associated in the legal literature with
government falsehoods in that it is primarily expressive in
nature. The unusual nature of this harm makes these lies
difficult to challenge under the First Amendment, as well as
under the Fourteenth Amendment undue-burden standard, as
it has been understood in the years leading up to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt.

73. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
580 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Categorizing the Speech

As explained above, under the First Amendment different
degrees of scrutiny apply to compelled speech mandates,
depending on the nature of the speech being compelled.74
Although some uncertainty remains about the appropriate
treatment of compelled professional speech, it is generally
subjected to rational-basis review so long as the regulation is
part and parcel of the regulation of the underlying profession
itself.75 Thus, informed consent requirements must actually be
pertinent to the medical treatment and further the goals of
that treatment.76 If they simply further unrelated goals or
contain irrelevant information, they would be scrutinized more
strictly. For example, requiring physicians to inform patients of
the medical risks of a particular surgery would be within the
scope of medical treatment, but requiring them to endorse a
particular political candidate would not.77 Thus, compelled
statements that are categorized as ideological speech will be
subjected to strict scrutiny, whereas compelled statements that
are categorized as professional speech and within the scope of
medical relevance will be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny.
When compelled private lies are challenged under the First
Amendment, however, courts have a particularly difficult time
categorizing them.78 Though many courts implicitly identify
them as professional speech, thus subjecting them to minimal
First Amendment scrutiny, some courts recognize that the
speech being compelled is in some instances ideological in
nature and therefore must be subject to stricter scrutiny.79 As I
74. See supra Section I.B.
75. Id. But see supra note 44 (explaining that some courts apply intermediate
scrutiny when professional speech is affected).
76. Post, supra note 38, at 952.
77. Id.
78. Similarly, courts have difficulty categorizing misleading or false speech by
crisis pregnancy centers, which also pertains to abortion. Hill, supra note 45, at
69 (citing Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir.
2014), Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2013),
and O’Brien v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 814 (D.
Md. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 683 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc,
721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub
nom. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013)).
79. Compare Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.
2008), and Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
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have argued elsewhere, this confusion may be explained, in
part, by the deeply contested nature of abortion itself.80 Some
judges implicitly frame abortion as a moral or ideological
matter, whereas others view it as a medical procedure and
fundamentally a matter of health care decision-making.81
Ironically, however, when judges view the procedure as
primarily a moral choice, rather than subjecting the compelled
speech to a heightened level of scrutiny, they view a wider
range of topics as being pertinent to the professional speech
that takes place between the doctor and the patient.82 They
therefore treat requirements such as telling women that the
fetus or embryo is a “whole, separate, unique, and living”
human being as relevant, truthful, and nonmisleading.83 By
contrast, when the judge’s understanding of the nature of the
abortion procedure is more medical, he or she is more likely to
characterize such mandatory disclosures as ideological in
nature and scrutinize them carefully.84 In sum, significant
confusion lingers in the caselaw.
B.

Identifying the Lies

Mandatory disclosures in the abortion context are often
misleading or likely to confuse, but not actually or entirely
false.85 This may be true whether the disclosure is a direct
government lie or a compelled private lie. The “suicide
advisory” required by South Dakota (discussed in Section I.B)
is one example. Similarly, some states require statements
regarding fetal pain—such as that the fetus has certain
“structures” in place by a certain gestational age that are
“necessary” for pain perception.86 Such statements may be
factually true in a narrow sense but are likely to be understood
570 (5th Cir. 2012), with Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), and
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v.
Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1219–21 (D. Kan. 2013).
80. Hill, supra note 45, at 66.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 66–67.
83. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 736.
84. Hill, supra note 45, at 66.
85. See, e.g., Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion:
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
111, 143 (2008).
86. E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(5) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3)
(2017).
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as implying that the fetus actually does feel pain, which is not
the meaning of the statement.87 Instead, the statement that
the fetus has the necessary anatomical structures in place
ignores the question whether the fetus is sufficiently conscious
to perceive pain—a complex issue mired in scientific
uncertainty.88
Though it is rhetorically powerful to refer to these
statements as “lies,” the problem is often that they simply lack
context or that they rely on existing but highly unreliable or
even disreputable evidence.89 Thus, it is not clear that they
should be labeled as lies. The term “lie” is a highly charged one,
and scholars have put forward various definitions. Professor
Helen Norton, for example, defines a lie as “a false assertion of
fact known by the speaker to be untrue and made with the
intention that the listener understand it to be true.”90 Professor
Seana Shiffrin, by contrast, emphasizes two elements in her
definition of lying: that the speaker does not believe her own
statement to be true; and that the speaker makes the
statement in a context in which the speaker intends her
statement to be taken as true.91 And the philosopher Thomas
L. Carson defines a lie as “a deliberate false statement that the
speaker warrants to be true.”92 All of these definitions are
difficult to apply to the sorts of misleading statements required
in the abortion context. First, Norton’s and Shiffrin’s
definitions rely on the speaker’s subjective intent, knowledge,
or belief about the statement. However, in the case of a false
statement promulgated by a state legislature—a multi-member
body whose individual members may act with differing
intentions and beliefs—the relevant intent or state of mind is
difficult to identify. Moreover, it is not clear whether the
individuals who vote for the sorts of measures discussed in this
article are aware the mandated disclosures are false.93 Finally,

87. Tobin, supra note 85, at 143–46.
88. Id. at 144–45.
89. Indeed, Caroline Corbin uses the term “distortion” instead of “lie.” Corbin,
supra note 32, at 1175.
90. Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 77.
91. SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 12.
92. THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15
(2010).
93. However, Seana Shiffrin’s definition allows for reckless statements made
without knowledge of whether they are true or false to meet her definition of lies.
SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 13. If someone makes a statement without knowing
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it is not entirely clear that all of the problematic disclosures are
actually false, as is required by Carson’s and Norton’s
definitions. Rather, they are misleading or deceptive in their
presentation in that they are presented as truthful but aimed
at producing false beliefs about abortion.94
Where compelled private lies are concerned, moreover,
there may be another complicating factor, in that the setting of
a live doctor-patient interaction presumably allows the
provider some flexibility in how the state’s information is
conveyed. For example, the provider can add context to
misleading assertions about particular medical risks.
Moreover, legislation mandating such disclosures in the form of
compelled private lies sometimes simply requires doctors to
discuss particular topics—such as the link between abortion
and breast cancer—rather than requiring particular
statements.95 Thus, the laws arguably allow doctors to modify
the required information by adding their own accurate and
nonmisleading information. Nonetheless, the deceptive effect
arises from the mere fact that the doctor is required to discuss
a purported risk that he or she believes to be nonexistent and
that he or she would not bring up but for the legal requirement.
By raising and then downplaying a particular purported risk,
the physician may nonetheless draw more attention to the risk
than is medically warranted. Yet, if the physician chooses to
ignore discussion of the risk altogether, even when the law
specifically calls it out, she may be inviting a lawsuit.
Compelled private speech thus puts abortion providers in a sort
of catch-22: they violate the law if they avoid the statemandated subjects of informed consent, but at the same time,
they are arguably providing an inaccurate impression to
patients merely by addressing them.

whether it is true, it still meets Shiffrin’s requirement that the speaker does not
believe it to be true. Id.
94. As such, they are perhaps better understood as “deceptions” rather than
“lies.” “Deception” may be defined to include statements that are intended to lead
the listener to a false belief or confirm a false belief, whether or not the speaker
believes the statements to be true. Id. at 19–20; CARSON, supra note 92, at 46.
95. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (2017) (requiring informed consent
to abortion to include “the particular medical risks associated with the particular
abortion procedure to be employed including, when medically accurate, the risks
of infection, hemorrhage and breast cancer, and the danger to subsequent
pregnancies and infertility”).
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Describing the Harm

Finally, government-sponsored lies in the abortion context
are particularly challenging to analyze under the standard
First Amendment doctrinal framework because the principal
type of harm that they cause is distinct from the type of harm
that government-sponsored lies cause in other contexts. Unlike
the harm caused by governmental lies aimed at the public on
more obviously political subjects, these lies are more targeted
at a specific individual or group, and the harm is primarily
expressive in nature.96 This is true of all three kinds of lies I
have identified here: direct government lies, compelled private
lies, and false narratives.
Some of the harms that are uniquely caused by
government lies include injury to the listener’s dignity that
arise from the deceptive and manipulative nature of the lies—
sometimes rising to the level of coercion or governmentsponsored deprivation of individuals’ liberty—and breach of
trust that violates the government’s duty to its citizens and
undermines public confidence in government.97 Moreover,
various values served by the First Amendment are undermined
when the government causes these harms by lying to its
citizens. Government lies undermine individual autonomy and
democratic self-governance.98 They also obstruct the search for
truth, which is an important end served by the First
Amendment.99 Recognizing that governmental lies may not be
easy to challenge under existing First Amendment doctrine,
however, Norton focuses on coercion as a possible touchstone of
unconstitutionality, finding that lies may sometimes coerce
individuals by directly interfering with their ability to exercise
their constitutional rights.100
96. As noted below, the harm may be more like the harm that arises from
defamatory lies about a particular individual or statements that bring a
particular, identifiable group into disrepute.
97. Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 79–83. Norton cites
several examples of government lies, including false justifications for military
engagement, false statements to cover up illegal activity by government officials,
and concealing the existence of a covert program or identity of an undercover
officer. Id. at 73–75. I argue here that such prototypical lies are less targeted at a
particular group than lies in the abortion context, and they do not create the same
kind of stigma.
98. Id. at 101.
99. Id. at 102.
100. Id. at 102–07.
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Coercion is certainly a concern when the government
mandates false information in the abortion context. In the
name of ensuring that a woman’s decision is fully informed and
therefore autonomous, states have engaged in deceptive
behavior and even required abortion providers to serve as
mouthpieces for misleading information.101 Even when
factually true, there is a great danger that the information—
such as information pertaining to the physical and mental
health risks of abortion—will be misunderstood by the woman
and deter her from proceeding with the abortion. Moreover, the
risk of misattribution accompanies compelled private lies,
which force abortion providers to promote the state’s message.
Because the state is deploying the provider to further its own
message, the woman may assume that the false or misleading
information is coming from her physician and accord the statemandated information more weight than she should.
Nonetheless, there is reason to doubt that coercion is the
biggest problem—or even a very real problem—with such
misstatements in the abortion context. Although misleading
statements have been found to reduce women’s knowledge
about abortion,102 there is little evidence to suggest that the
informed consent process actually leads women to change their
minds. Indeed, researchers have demonstrated that ultrasound
viewing, which is sometimes state-mandated as part of the
informed consent process, has virtually no effect on a woman’s
decision to continue with the abortion.103 Similarly, a review of
the social science literature on mandatory counseling and
waiting period laws found that state-required counseling, with
or without a mandatory waiting period, likely had no effect on
the abortion decision.104 Waiting periods accompanied by an in101. See supra Section I.B.
102. N.F. Berglas et al., State-Mandated (Mis)Information and Women’s
Endorsement of Common Abortion Myths, 27 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 129
(2017).
103. Mary Gatter et al., Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and
Proceeding to Abortion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81 (2014) (finding that
98.4 percent of women who view the ultrasound proceed to terminate the
pregnancy, as compared to 99 percent of women who do not view the ultrasound).
The impact is slightly greater for the small minority of women who come into the
clinic with “low decision certainty.” Id.
104. THEODORE J. JOYCE ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE IMPACT OF STATE
MANDATORY COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIOD LAWS ON ABORTION:
A LITERATURE REVIEW 15 (Guttmacher Inst. 2009) https://www.guttmacher.
org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/mandatorycounseling.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4R3-
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person counseling requirement, which force women to make
two trips to the abortion provider, were, however, “associated
with a decline in the abortion rate, a rise in abortions obtained
out of state and an increase in the proportion of secondtrimester abortions.”105 This suggests that the expense and
difficulty of making multiple trips to an abortion provider may
cause women to forgo or delay an abortion, but the information
given in counseling does not.
In view of this empirical evidence, I contend that the
primary harm caused by governmental misinformation about
abortion arises not from the deception, but rather from the
stigmatizing or even traumatizing impact of the particular
information conveyed. The likely outcome of providing the sorts
of misinformation about abortion described in this article is not
that the woman will carry to term. Rather, the more likely
outcome is that she will terminate the pregnancy anyway,
while experiencing fear, guilt, and shame as a result of the
false and stigmatizing information that she is given.106
Researchers have studied the emotional impact of
ultrasound viewing on women seeking abortion in order to test
the hypothesis that seeing the image of the fetus causes the
woman to form a bond with the fetus.107 They found no
evidence of such an effect.108 They found that the most common
2PGC].
105. Id.
106. Seana Shiffrin identifies the primary harm of lying as impeding the
listener’s ability “to construct a reliable picture of our world, so that we can
navigate through it and understand who we are and where we are situated”—an
understanding that is necessary to forming moral beliefs and fulfilling moral
duties. SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 9–10. This description resonates in some ways
with my description of the expressive harm that arises from governmentsponsored falsehoods in the abortion context. I argue that the expressive injury
consists of imposing a particular moral valence on abortion. As such, like other
lies, the government-sponsored falsehoods distort—and are aimed at distorting—
the woman’s moral understanding of her own conduct.
107. Katrina Kimport et al., Beyond Political Claims: Women’s Interest in and
Emotional Response to Viewing Their Ultrasound Image in Abortion Care, 46
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 185, 185 (2014). This study relied
on data from the Turnaway Study, a large-scale project in which over 700 women
from thirty abortion clinics across the country were interviewed for approximately
forty-five minutes one week after their abortion. The women were asked whether
they viewed an ultrasound and how it made them feel, and they were also asked
how difficult the decision was for them. The researchers then performed
qualitative analysis on the women’s narrative answers, as well as logistic
regression analysis to control for various factors. Id.
108. Id. at 190. However, they found that women who sought abortions in
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emotion experienced by women after ultrasound viewing was
neutral.109 The next most commonly reported emotions, out of
nine possible emotions identified by the researchers, were
negative ones—sadness or depression (49 of 212 women), guilt
or second-guessing (30 women), or feeling upset or bad (29
women).110 Thus, the three negative emotions combined
significantly outweighed the neutral (77 women) or positive
emotions (48 women).111 These findings, together with the
conclusion that ultrasound viewing does not actually affect the
woman’s ultimate decision, strongly suggest that the primary
impact of ultrasound laws is to cause women to experience
negative emotions about their already firm decision to abort. It
is reasonable to conclude, moreover, that ideological
information casting abortion in a negative light or falsely
inflating the risks of the procedure would lead to similar
negative emotions.112
Extrapolating a bit from these studies, the available
evidence on the actual, real-life effects of misleading abortion
disclosures appears to be as follows. First, women generally
believe the misleading information, so it reduces their
knowledge about the procedure and makes their decisions less
informed. Second, state-mandated disclosures do not have an
effect on whether the woman carries out her decision to
terminate her pregnancy (unless the law mandating the
disclosures also imposes other burdens that may have a
stronger deterrent effect, such as requiring two or more trips to
the clinic).113 Third, at least some such requirements cause
distress and emotional suffering for a large subset of the
women subjected to them. Of course, not every type of
government lie related to abortion has been carefully examined
states with laws requiring they be offered ultrasounds were more likely to choose
to view the ultrasound—“suggest[ing] the possibility that viewing ‘offers’ are
experienced more as ‘recommendations’ by patients.” Id.
109. Id. at 188.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The emotional impact of such misleading statements has not, to my
knowledge, been systematically studied.
113. In one study, 36 percent to 70 percent of women undergoing pre-abortion
counseling did not know or were unsure about several basic facts regarding
abortion, such as whether it is safer than childbirth or whether it increases the
risk of infertility; nonetheless, “the overwhelming majority” of women in that
study stated that they were certain about their decision, and 86 percent had an
abortion. Berglas et al., supra note 102, at 133.
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in the social science literature, and the emotional impact on
women of these legally mandated lies has not been thoroughly
studied. These conclusions nonetheless suggest that the
misleading nature of the information, while obviously
troubling, is only part of the story. The expressive harm that is
caused by the stigmatizing nature of the message is the other
essential facet.
III. EXPRESSIVE HARM AND THE UNDUE BURDEN FRAMEWORK
I argued in Section II.C that the primary harm wrought by
government-sponsored falsehoods in the abortion context is not
that they foster misconceptions (though they certainly do that)
or that they injure individuals’ autonomy by dissuading them
from a particular course of action through the use of false
pretenses (though they may sometimes do that as well).
Rather, the primary harm in such cases is the targeted
emotional impact caused by the stigmatizing content of the
message. I argue here that this harm is akin to other sorts of
“expressive harm,” such as when the government sponsors
religious messages that violate the Establishment Clause or
when it otherwise embraces a message that casts one group as
inferior to another.
A well-developed body of legal scholarship has explored the
idea that government actions may sometimes carry a message
that is stigmatizing to a particular group, implying that that
group does not share equal status with other members of
society.114 The paradigm example of this is when the
government endorses a particular set of religious beliefs by
promoting messages or symbols associated with only one
religion or subset of religions.115 However, some scholars have
suggested that the concept of expressive harm may extend to
other constitutional contexts and forbid government actions
that stigmatize individuals based on other characteristics such

114. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV.
648 (2013) (arguing that official religious speech, as well as other forms of official
speech that expressively denigrate particular groups, violates the constitution);
Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999) (discussing
expressive harms); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
“Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993).
115. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989).
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as race, sex, or sexual orientation.116 I contend here that, more
than coercion or direct threats to autonomy, the harm of
government-mandated lies of all sorts in the abortion context is
that they stigmatize women seeking abortions by casting
abortion in an extremely negative light, causing emotional
injury and distress.
In addition, while government-mandated lies have long
been resistant to constitutional challenge under the First
Amendment and under the undue burden standard of the
Fourteenth Amendment, I argue that the Supreme Court’s
2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt suggests
a new way to challenge such misinformation. In Whole
Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court struck down two Texas
regulations that imposed onerous requirements on abortion
clinics, threatening to shutter roughly three-quarters of the
state’s existing providers.117 Although the regulations at issue
in that case did not involve informed consent or statemandated misinformation, the Court, in the course of its
analysis, revisited the meaning of Casey’s “undue burden”
framework in ways that may prove helpful to plaintiffs seeking
to
challenge
misleading
abortion
informed
consent
requirements.
Before Whole Woman’s Health, under Casey, an undue
burden was understood by many courts to exist only when a
state abortion restriction was so onerous that a large fraction of
women was actually prevented from accessing the abortions
they sought.118 This framework did not provide much room for
challenging informed consent requirements—even blatantly
misleading ones—because it simply could not be shown that
women were actually deterred by this information.119
116. Tebbe, supra note 114, at 650; Note, supra note 114, at 1314–18.
117. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016).
118. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 300 (5th Cir.
2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014); Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v.
Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Casey to “require[] courts to
determine whether a large fraction of the women ‘for whom the law is a
restriction’ will be ‘deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
[government] has outlawed abortion in all cases’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,
222 F.3d 157, 167–72 (4th Cir. 2000).
119. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d
684 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to an in-person informed consent and
waiting-period requirement because the plaintiff could not prove that the falling
number of abortions in the state was the result of the law’s requirements).
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Moreover, in some cases, as explained above, courts have bent
over backwards to characterize state-mandated information in
such a way as to hold that it was truthful, nonmisleading, and
relevant.120
However, the undue burden test, as newly explained in
Whole Woman’s Health, requires courts to balance the benefits
and burdens of a law, thereby refocusing the inquiry on the
evidence supporting the law’s purported effects.121 If a law
imposes a significant burden on a woman’s abortion access
while conferring minimal benefit, that burden must be
considered “undue.”122 Whole Woman’s Health also appears to
place at least some burden on states to articulate a meaningful
benefit resulting from the law and to produce evidence
supporting that claimed benefit.123
This reading suggests a new line of attack on misleading
state-mandated information in the abortion context. Those
wishing to challenge the constitutionality of misleading
abortion
disclosure
requirements
can
argue—and
demonstrate—that there is no actual benefit conferred by such
requirements. As such, in the total absence of any benefit, any
burden that the requirements impose on women seeking
abortions must be considered “undue.”
To the extent that state-mandated lies of all three sorts are
justified in the name of informing a woman’s choice, it must be
pointed out that misleading or deceptive information cannot
meaningfully serve the purpose of informing a woman’s choice.
And indeed, the available empirical evidence confirms that a
woman’s knowledge about the actual risks of abortion is
decreased rather than increased by the sorts of misleading
information provided by the most recent spate of informed
consent laws.124
Whole Woman’s Health may also call into question whether
laws such as ultrasound requirements actually advance any
state interests unrelated to health and safety, such as
protecting fetal life and encouraging women to choose

120. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894 (8th
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
121. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
122. Id. at 2310, 2318.
123. Id. at 2310.
124. Berglas et al., supra note 102, at 129.
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childbirth over abortion.125 As discussed above, the available
evidence simply does not support the notion that women are
susceptible to changing their mind about the abortion upon
receiving this information in the clinic setting, after an
abortion decision has been made.126 Most women who seek an
abortion are certain of their decision, and disclosure
requirements appear to do little to change that.127 Rather,
ultrasound requirements and misleading informed consent
laws stigmatize women and cause them emotional distress,
with minimal to no offsetting benefits. At a minimum, in
advancing a particular interest such as protecting fetal life, the
state should bear the burden under Whole Woman’s Health of
putting forth some evidence to support the notion that the law
does in fact serve that interest.
Finally, one can question, after Whole Woman’s Health,
whether laws requiring burial or cremation of fetal tissue
meaningfully advance any state interest at all. Although states
have claimed that such provisions serve the state’s interest in
the dignity of potential life, courts may reasonably question
whether this interest in potential life continues to exist after
an abortion is completed and there is no longer a potential
life.128 And with respect to both fetal burial-or-cremation laws
and ultrasound laws, it is also worth pointing out that the state
does not have a legitimate interest in imposing its own
narrative of pregnancy and motherhood upon women seeking
abortions. As the Supreme Court explained in Casey, “[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.”129 Similarly, one lower federal court dealing with a

125. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 103–106.
127. Berglas et al., supra note 102, at 134; D.G. Foster et al., Attitudes and
Decision Making Among Women Seeking Abortions at One U.S. Clinic, 44
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 117 (2012) (finding 87 percent
decisional certainty in a study of women at one clinic).
128. Hopkins v. Jegley, No. 4:17-CV-00404-KGB, 2017 WL 3220445, at *63
(E.D. Ark. July 28, 2017); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d
218, 229–30 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r, 265
F. Supp. 3d 859, 871–72 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
129. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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burial-or-cremation law has recognized that the law
“inferentially establish[ed] the beginning of human life as
conception, potentially undermining the constitutional
protection afforded to personal beliefs and central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”130 In addition to
shedding doubt upon the state’s interest in fetal burial or
cremation, this recognition also demonstrates that the sort of
harm caused by such requirements is similar to the harm
caused by violations of the Establishment Clause. In both
cases, the government places its imprimatur on one set of
religiously identified beliefs and implies that other beliefs are
not of equal value.131
Moreover, it is fair to read Whole Woman’s Health as
expanding the types of harm that courts can weigh against a
law’s purported benefits. In particular, the Court did not
suggest that the only relevant burden is one that prevents a
large fraction of women from obtaining an abortion at all.
Instead, the Court gave short shrift to this concept, which was
derived from Casey and embraced by courts that adopted a
narrow interpretation of “undue burden.”132 Rather, the Court
took into account the increased distances women would have to
travel, reduced quality of care, and other intangible forms of
harm resulting from the Texas restrictions.133 The version of
the undue-burden test articulated in Whole Woman’s Health
thus allows courts to take into account the expressive harm
and stigma imposed by all three types of government-sponsored
lies, and to weigh them against the essentially nonexistent
health benefits, to find such requirements unconstitutional.
There are, of course, limitations to this new avenue for
challenging state-mandated lies in the abortion context. First,
130. Whole Woman’s Health, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at
846, 851).
131. Cf. SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 111–12 (suggesting an affiliation between
the interests served by truthful free speech and other autonomy rights).
132. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016)
(discussing the “large fraction” test in only one brief paragraph); sources cited
supra note 118 (describing the narrow understanding of “undue burden,” which
requires a law to prevent a large fraction of women from obtaining an abortion
before it will be found unconstitutional).
133. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318 (“Texas seeks to force women to
travel long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities.
Patients seeking these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized
attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed
facilities may have offered.”).
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expressive harm is not easily amenable to challenge under
existing constitutional doctrine. For example, it is not clear
what theory of standing would allow a plaintiff to challenge a
government action that imposes only expressive harm.134
Second, the expressive meaning of non-expressive government
conduct may be difficult to discern, or at least subject to
dispute in many cases.135 Finally, Whole Woman’s Health
focused primarily on the material burdens and obstacles to
abortion access imposed by the Texas regulations that
threatened to close three-quarters of the state’s abortion
clinics—a very concrete harm that is arguably quite
distinguishable from the stigmatic harm described here.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, Whole Woman’s Health
clearly considered less severe and more intangible harms to be
relevant to its analysis. Therefore, in some circumstances—
particularly those in which a material harm accompanies a
stigmatic harm—Whole Woman’s Health offers intriguing
possibilities. Such circumstances may occur with respect to
laws that combine misleading informed consent requirements
with onerous waiting-period and in-person counseling
requirements that necessitate two or more trips to the abortion
clinic. Concrete harm may also accompany stigmatic harm with
respect to fetal burial-or-cremation laws if the law’s legal
requirements are prohibitively expensive to comply with. In
many cases, such laws may effectively shut down some or all of
the abortion clinics in the state.136 Thus, while not a panacea,
Whole Woman’s Health may well offer a promising way forward
for challenging all types of state-mandated lies in the abortion
context.

134. NAACP v. Horne, 626 F. App’x 200, 201 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming
dismissal of a challenge to an Arizona law banning abortion for reasons of the sex
or race of the fetus, holding that the “stigmatizing effect of the statutes” was
insufficient injury to support standing); see also Note, supra note 114, at 1323–25
(identifying the lack of consistency with respect to standing in cases involving
expressive harm).
135. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 114, at 507–08; see generally Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276–301 (1987).
136. Hopkins v. Jegley, No. 4:17-CV-00404-KGB, 2017 WL 3220445, at *61
(E.D. Ark. July 28, 2017); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d
218, 230–32 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (noting the Texas fetal burial-or-cremation law
would “pose significant logistical challenges for healthcare providers in terms of
sorting procedure, storage, transportation, and ultimate disposal” and may prove
impossible to comply with).
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CONCLUSION
This article has described the various forms of misleading
statements that states mandate for women seeking abortions.
It argues that the harm arising from the lies in this particular
interaction are unique and that they are distinct in several
ways from the harms brought about by governmental lies in
other contexts. These unique qualities render such
requirements particularly unsuited to challenge under the
First Amendment and under the “undue burden” standard of
the Fourteenth Amendment as it was understood by many
courts until recently. This article proposes, however, that the
undue burden framework as articulated in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt may provide the most viable avenue for
future challenges to the constitutionality of governmentmandated misinformation in the abortion context.

